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Many	  people	  die	  while	  waiting	  for	  organ	  transplants	  even	  though	  the	  number	  of	  usable	  organs	  
is	  far	  larger	  than	  the	  number	  needed	  for	  transplant.	  Governments	  have	  devised	  many	  policies	  
aimed	   at	   increasing	   available	   transplant	   organs	   with	   variable	   success.	   	   However,	   with	   few	  
exceptions,	  policy	  makers	  are	  reluctant	  to	  establish	  markets	  for	  organs	  despite	  the	  potential	  for	  
mutually	   beneficial	   exchanges.	   	  We	   ask	  whether	   organ	  markets	   could	   save	   lives.	   	   Controlled	  
laboratory	  methods	   are	   ideal	   for	   this	   inquiry	   because	   human	   lives	   would	   be	   involved	   when	  
implementing	   field	   trials.	   	  Our	  results	  suggest	   that	  markets	  can	   increase	  the	  supply	  of	  organs	  
available	   for	   transplant,	   but	   that	   the	   specific	   institutional	   design	   of	   such	   markets	   must	   be	  
carefully	   considered.	   	   However,	   the	   increased	   supply	   of	   transplantable	   organs	   derives	  
disproportionately	  from	  the	  poor.	   	  We	  also	  find	  that	  exogenously	  reducing	   incentives	  to	  keep	  
one’s	  organs	  has	  a	  similar	  effect	  to	  creating	  a	  market,	  but	  with	  equitable	  donation	  rates	  across	  
income	  levels.	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Introduction	  
Advances	   in	   medical	   technology	   enable	   human	   organs	   to	   be	   transplanted	   from	   one	  
person	  to	  another.	  	  Many	  types	  of	  organ	  transplant	  are	  now	  fairly	  routine	  procedures	  that	  save	  
thousands	  of	   lives	  each	  year.	  	  However,	  countries	  around	  the	  world	  face	  chronic	  shortages	  of	  
organs	   for	   transplant.	   In	   the	   United	   States	   more	   than	   80,000	   people	   in	   need	   of	   a	   kidney	  
transplant	  are	  currently	  on	  a	  waiting	  list	  for	  a	  donor	  kidney.1	  Deceased	  donors	  account	  for	  most	  
transplant	  organs,	  though	  kidneys	  from	  living	  donors	  (usually	  family	  members)	  provide	  organs	  
to	   an	   increasing	   number	   of	   those	   waiting.	   However,	   since	   data	   was	   first	   collected	   in	   1988,	  
demand	  for	  kidneys	  has	  grown	  far	  more	  quickly	  than	  donor	  supply.	  In	  fact,	  in	  just	  the	  last	  year,	  
over	  4000	  Americans	  died	  while	  on	  the	  waiting	  list	  for	  kidney	  transplants,	  and	  the	  numbers	  are	  
even	  higher	  when	  we	  include	  patients	  who	  die	  while	  waiting	  for	  other	  organs.2	  
Societies	   are	   grappling	   with	   ways	   to	   reduce	   the	   shortage	   of	   transplantable	   organs.	  	  
Cynowiec,	   et	   al	   (2009)	   conclude	   that	   this	   effort	  will	   focus	  heavily	   on	  providing	   incentives	   for	  
increasing	  organ	  supply.	  However,	  as	  pointed	  out	  by	  Surman,	  et	  al	  (2008)	  there	  are	  insufficient	  
data	   to	   provide	   a	   solid	   foundation	   for	   new	   policy.	   	   Jasper,	   et	   al	   (2004)	   and	   Haddow	   (2006)	  
report	   surveys	   of	   US	  medical	   professionals’	   and	   the	   Scottish	   general	   public’s	   views	   on	   using	  
various	  monetary	   and	   non-­‐monetary	   incentives	   to	   promote	   donation,	   respectively,	   and	   both	  
find	   that	  many	  people	  are	  opposed	   to	   incentives	  even	   though	   they	  believe	  such	  mechanisms	  
would	  be	  effective.	  	  Jasper	  et	  al	  (2004)	  claim	  “nothing	  short	  of	  a	  market	  test	  can	  demonstrate	  
conclusively	  the	  impact	  that	  incentives	  would	  have	  on	  the	  supply	  of	  donated	  organs.”(p.	  384)	  
We	  rely	  upon	  experimental	  methods	  to	  test	  the	  impact	  of	  creating	  a	  market	  for	  organs.	  	  
As	   argued	   by	   Smith	   (1994)	   controlled	   laboratory	   experiments	   provide	   a	   means	   to	   evaluate	  
policy	   proposals.	   	   Specifically,	   we	   model	   the	   incentives	   faced	   by	   donors	   and	   recipients	   to	  
explore	  mechanisms	  for	  increasing	  the	  supply	  of	  organs.	  We	  test	  1)	  the	  lifesaving	  effectiveness	  
of	   reducing	   the	   opportunity	   cost	   (repugnance)	   of	   organ	   transfer,	   2)	   the	   power	   of	   a	   market	  
solution	   to	  an	  organ	   shortage,	   and	  3)	   the	  distributional	   impact	  of	   these	   interventions.	   In	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Statistic	  from	  US	  Dept.	  of	  Health	  and	  Human	  Services	  (http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/rptData.asp)	  
2	  http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB119490273908090431.html	  
laboratory	  we	  control	  the	  number	  of	  people	  in	  need	  of	  an	  organ,	  the	  number	  of	  potential	  organ	  
providers,	   and	   the	   wealth	   of	   each	   agent.	   We	   begin	   with	   a	   system	   of	   “presumed	   consent”	  
voluntary	  donation	  in	  which	  agents	  may	  opt	  out	  of	  donating	  or	  accepting	  an	  organ.	  To	  model	  
repugnance	   or	   an	   ethical	   cost	   of	   transferring	   organs,	   we	   implement	   a	   lottery	   with	   a	   large	  
potential	  payoff.3	  This	   lottery	   is	  available	  only	   to	   those	  not	  exchanging	  organs.	  	  By	  comparing	  
situations	   with	   and	   without	   this	   lottery,	   we	   can	   directly	   evaluate	   the	   effects	   of	   induced	  
opportunity	   cost	   for	   organ	   donation	   or	   sales.	   To	   determine	  whether	   access	   to	   a	  market	   for	  
organs	  will	  reduce	  the	  excess	  demand	  for	  organs	  we	  replicate	  the	  lottery	  environment	  with	  and	  
without	  a	  market.	  	  	  
We	   find	   that	   eliminating	   the	   lottery	   increases	   the	   number	   of	   lives	   saved	   by	   organ	  
donation	  relative	  to	  our	  baseline,	  presumed	  consent	  condition;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  market	  
actually	  increases	  the	  death	  rate.	  We	  identify	  the	  causes	  of	  death	  in	  the	  baseline	  treatment	  as	  
both	   insufficient	  demand	  and	   insufficient	   supply.	  While	  eliminating	   the	   lottery	   solves	  both	  of	  
these	  problems,	   the	  market	  only	   increases	  supply.	  However,	  only	  11%	  of	   those	   in	  need	  of	  an	  
organ	  would	  have	  been	  unable	  to	  acquire	  one	  at	  some	  price	  in	  the	  market	  treatment.	  	  Hence,	  
we	  find	  more	  support	  for	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  market	  solution	  than	  indicated	  by	  the	  death	  
rate	  statistics	  alone.	  A	  combination	  of	  institutional	  factors	  and	  market	  thinness	  caused	  many	  of	  
the	   deaths	   in	   the	   market	   treatment,	   highlighting	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   specific	   market	  
institution	   in	  any	  proposal	   to	  create	  an	  active	  organ	  market.	   	  Furthermore,	  as	  some	  critics	  of	  
organ	   markets	   have	   suggested,	   we	   find	   that	   organ	   sales	   are	   primarily	   undertaken	   by	   poor	  
subjects.	  
We	   also	   conducted	   a	   post-­‐experiment	   survey	   to	   gauge	   the	   views	   of	   our	   respondents	  
regarding	  organ	  markets	  and	  donations	  and	  ask	  if	  these	  attitudes	  correlate	  with	  their	  observed	  
behavior	   in	   the	  experiment.	   	  Overwhelmingly,	   our	   respondents	  were	   supportive	  of	   voluntary	  
organ	  donation,	  although	  Catholic	  respondents	  were	  less	  supportive.	  	  On	  average	  respondents	  
were	  indifferent	  to	  compensating	  donors	  or	  their	  families,	  but	  they	  were	  strongly	  opposed	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Clearly	  we	  cannot	  actually	  induce	  the	  strong	  moral	  feelings,	  desperate	  needs,	  and	  risks	  associated	  with	  organ	  
donation,	  sales	  and	  transplantation	  in	  the	  lab	  without	  actually	  creating	  a	  market	  for	  organs	  (something	  IRB	  will	  not	  
allow).	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  induced	  cost	  is	  merely	  to	  model	  the	  incentives	  involved	  in	  organ	  transplantation.	  
“selling	  organs.”	   	  Reported	  opinions	  of	  organ	  markets	  and	  donations	  were	  uncorrelated	  with	  
donations	  in	  the	  experiment.	  	  However,	  subjects	  who	  offered	  to	  sell	  organs	  in	  the	  experiment	  
were	  more	  supportive	  of	  selling	  organs	  with	  the	  proceeds	  going	  to	  charity.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Background	  
Many	  policy	  solutions	  to	  the	  organ	  shortage	  have	  been	  suggested,	  but	  none	  has	  been	  so	  
controversial	   as	  permitting	  a	   (regulated)	  market	   for	  organs.	   In	   the	  1960s,	  British	  newspapers	  
began	  printing	  advertisements	  from	  live	  donors	  attempting	  to	  sell	  their	  kidneys,	  suggesting	  the	  
prospect	   of	   an	   open	   market	   in	   human	   organs	   (Dukeminier	   Jr.,	   1970).	   In	   1983,	   a	   former	  
physician,	  Dr.	  H.	  Barry	  Jacobs	  created	  a	  brokerage	  for	  human	  kidneys	   in	  Virginia,	  opening	  the	  
debate	   in	   the	   United	   States	   and	   sparking	   moral	   outrage.	   Within	   a	   year,	   a	   federal	   law	   was	  
passed	  to	  ban	  the	  sale	  of	  human	  organs	  and	  his	  company	  was	  shuttered	  (S.H.D.	  1985).4	  Roth	  
(2007)	  argues	  that	  the	  “repugnance”	  of	  such	  transactions	  stems	  from	  moral	  opposition	  to	  the	  
objectification	  of	  the	  body,	  the	  potential	  for	  coercion,	  and	  the	  fear	  that	  permitting	  one	  sort	  of	  
problematic	   transaction	   will	   open	   the	   door	   to	   a	   host	   of	   others.	   Whether	   the	   objection	   is	  
grounded	   in	   an	   individualized	  moral	   code,	   shared	   cultural	   heritage,	   or	   religious	   creed,	  many	  
people	   regard	   the	   buying	   and	   selling	   of	   the	   body	   as	   taboo.	   To	   uphold	   a	   moral	   code	   or	   to	  
maintain	   purity,	   people	   are	   willing	   to	   rule	   out	   even	   the	   possibility	   of	   potentially	   beneficial	  
transactions	  (Durkheim	  1976,	  Belk	  et	  al.	  1989).	  
Despite	   others’	   strong	   moral	   objections,	   many	   proponents	   of	   kidney	   markets	   have	  
argued	   that	   providing	   monetary	   incentives	   to	   increase	   supply	   of	   transplant	   kidneys	   would	  
alleviate	   shortages	   and	   supplement	   kidneys	   provided	  by	   altruistic	   donors	   (Arrow	  1972,	   Perry	  
1980,	  S.H.D.	  1985,	  Mahoney	  2000,	  Becker	  and	  Elias	  2007).	  Opponents	  of	  a	  market	   in	  kidneys	  
have	  argued	  that	  the	  commoditization	  of	  organs	  may	  actually	  crowd	  out	  altruistic	  motivations	  
and	  thereby	  decrease	  the	  total	  quantity	  supplied	  (Titmuss	  1971,	  Singer	  1973,	  DeJong	  et	  al	  1995,	  
Byrne	  and	  Thompson	  2001).	  Additionally,	  opponents	  argue	   that	   the	  decision	   to	   sell	   an	  organ	  
may	   lead	   to	   time-­‐inconsistent	   decisions	   and	   regret	   (Byrne	   and	   Thompson	   2001,	   Satz	   2008).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  India	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s	  and	  Iran	  since	  1988	  are	  the	  only	  examples	  of	  legal	  organ	  markets.	  (Becker	  and	  
Elias	  2007)	  
Some	   also	   highlight	   the	   potential	   negative	   distributional	   consequences	   of	   kidney	   sales	   by	  
pointing	  to	  the	  injustice	  of	  a	  system	  in	  which	  organ	  sales	  are	  undertaken	  primarily	  by	  the	  poor	  
and	  desperate	  (Archard	  2002,	  Borna	  1987).5,6	  
Of	  those	  opposed	  to	  market	  solutions	  for	  the	  shortage	  of	  transplantable	  organs,	  many	  
argue	   that	   sufficient	   supply	   could	   be	   obtained	   through	   better	   marketing	   to	   the	   altruism	   of	  
potential	  donors	  and	  that	  the	  kidney	  shortage	  represents	  a	  failure	  that	  could	  be	  alleviated	  by	  
simply	   improving	   procurement	   efforts	   (Prottas	   1983,	   Thorne	   1998,	   Healy	   2004).	   There	   is	  
empirical	   evidence	   that	   a	   policy	   of	   “presumed	   consent”	   for	   donation,	   a	   legal	   regime	   under	  
which	   people	   are	   presumed	   to	   be	   willing	   to	   donate	   organs	   upon	   death	   unless	   they	   specify	  
otherwise,	   increases	   the	   available	   supply	   of	   kidneys.	   This	   approach	   has	   been	   successfully	  
adopted	   in	   Spain,	   Portugal	   and	   Austria	   (Abadie	   and	   Gay,	   2006,	   Mossialos	   et	   al,	   2008).	   The	  
United	  States	  relies	  upon	  an	  “informed	  consent”	  or	  opt-­‐in	  system	  for	  deceased	  organ	  donation;	  
however,	   even	   if	   all	   cadaveric	   kidneys	  were	  made	   available	   for	   transplant,	   a	   shortage	  would	  
remain,	  highlighting	   the	  potential	  power	  of	   a	  market	   solution	   (Israni	  et	   al,	   2005,	  Beard	  et	   al,	  
2006).	   Furthermore,	   Tetlock	   et	   al.	   (2000),	   and	   Tetlock	   (2003)	   describe	   survey	   evidence	   that	  
people	   are	   willing	   to	   make	   taboo	   trade-­‐offs	   despite	   their	   strongly-­‐held	   moral	   beliefs	   which	  
indicates	   that	   market	   incentives	   could	   overcome	   moral	   objections	   to	   donation.	   Hence,	   we	  
design	   a	   stylized	   experiment	   that	   induces	   both	   the	   necessity	   and	   opportunity	   cost	   of	   organ	  
transfer	  in	  order	  to	  test	  the	  welfare	  effects	  of	  a	  market	  solution	  to	  organ	  shortages.	  
Experimental	  Design	  
To	   explore	   the	   impact	   of	   a	   market	   for	   organs,	   we	   employ	   a	   partial	   2x2	   within-­‐subjects	  
experimental	  design.	   	  The	  first	  dimension	  is	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  organ	  market	  and	  the	  second	  
dimension	  is	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  not	  retaining	  one’s	  organ.	  	  In	  the	  Baseline	  
environment,	   there	   is	  no	  market	   for	  organs,	  but	  people	   can	  donate	   them	  and	  people	  have	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Hypothetical	  survey	  evidence	  in	  Halpern	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  suggests	  that	  income	  is	  not	  strongly	  correlated	  with	  
willingness	  to	  sell	  or	  donate	  kidneys	  and	  that	  other	  factors	  such	  as	  own	  risk	  of	  kidney	  failure,	  the	  price	  offered,	  and	  
relation	  to	  the	  recipient	  are	  dominant.	  However,	  as	  we	  detail	  below,	  our	  results	  suggest	  that	  when	  the	  decisions	  
involve	  real	  monetary	  incentives,	  wealth	  may	  matter.	  	  
6	  Harvey	  (1990)	  objects	  not	  to	  direct	  transfers	  for	  organs,	  but	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  middleman	  profiting	  from	  the	  organ	  
of	  another	  individual.	  	  
positive	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  not	  retaining	  an	  organ	  after	  death.	  	  This	  positive	  opportunity	  cost	  is	  
meant	   to	   model	   some	   internal	   opposition	   (religious,	   ethical,	   disgust,	   etc.)	   to	   separating	   the	  
organ	  from	  its	  original	  owner.7	  	  Specifically,	  those	  people	  who	  do	  not	  donate	  or	  accept	  an	  organ	  
are	  entered	  into	  a	  lottery	  that	  pays	  $100	  with	  a	  0.001	  chance	  and	  0	  with	  a	  0.999	  chance.	  	  The	  
expected	  value	  of	  this	  lottery	  is	  a	  dime	  and	  a	  risk-­‐averse	  individual	  will	  value	  it	  even	  less.8	  Thus,	  
theopportunity	  cost	  of	  donation	  is	  low,	  but	  it	  offers	  some	  chance	  of	  a	  large	  reward.	  	  	  
Each	  group	  of	  subjects	  first	  participates	  in	  a	  Baseline	  treatment	  with	  a	  presumed	  consent	  (opt-­‐
out)	  policy,	  which	   is	  meant	   to	   represent	   the	  current	  best-­‐case	  policy	   situation.	   	  The	  group	  of	  
subjects	   then	   participates	   in	   one	   of	   the	   two	   alternative	   treatments	   meant	   to	   coincide	   with	  
potential	   solutions	   for	   increasing	   the	  supply	  of	   transplanted	  organs.	   In	   the	  Market	   treatment	  
we	   introduce	  a	  market	   that	  allows	  people	   to	  sell	  organs;	  while,	   in	   the	  NoLotto	   treatment	  we	  
eliminate	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  donating	  the	  organ	  (that	  is,	  the	  lottery	  for	  those	  who	  choose	  
not	  to	  accept	  or	  donate).	  	  Creating	  a	  market	  compensates	  those	  who	  allow	  their	  organs	  to	  be	  
transplanted,	  thus	  increasing	  the	  marginal	  benefit	  of	  doing	  so.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  removing	  the	  
lottery	  represents	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  marginal	  cost	  of	  having	  one’s	  organs	  transplanted.	  	  Either	  
treatment	   is	   expected	   to	   increase	   the	   number	   of	   organs	   offered	   for	   transplant.	   	   In	   the	  
experiments	   organs	  were	   referred	   to	   as	  assets	   so	   as	   not	   to	   bias	   subject	   behavior;	   however,	  
other	  terms	  described	  below	  such	  as	  “Poor,”	  “Wealthy,”	  “Young”	  and	  “Old”	  were	  used	  to	  aid	  
subjects	  in	  understanding	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  experiment	  as	  described	  below.	  
In	   each	   laboratory	   session	   there	   are	   ten	   subjects	  who	   interact	   in	   an	  overlapping	   generations	  
framework	   where	   people	   live	   for	   two	   periods.	   	   In	   the	   first	   period	   there	   are	   three	   “Young”	  
people	  and	  three	  “Old”	  people.	  	  The	  other	  six	  people	  are	  inactive.	  	  In	  the	  second	  period,	  three	  
of	   the	   people	  who	  were	   inactive	   in	   the	   first	   period	   become	   “Young,”	   the	   three	   people	  who	  
were	   Young	   in	   the	   first	   period	   become	  Old,	   and	   the	   three	   people	  who	  were	  Old	   in	   the	   first	  
period	   become	   inactive.	   	   This	   process	   repeats	   after	   each	   period.	   	   To	   avoid	   issues	   associated	  
with	  repeated	  play	  games,	  each	  Old	  person	  must	  be	  inactive	  for	  one	  period	  before	  returning	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  If	  our	  market	  included	  live	  donors,	  we	  could	  induce	  risk	  with	  a	  similar	  mechanism.	  
8	  Previous	  experimental	  work	  has	  routinely	  found	  that	  people	  behave	  as	  if	  they	  are	  risk	  averse	  (see	  e.g.	  Holt	  and	  
Laury	  2002;	  Goeree	  et	  al.	  2003	  and	  Cox	  et	  al	  1982).	  
the	  economy,	  the	  number	  of	  inactive	  people	  is	  larger	  than	  the	  next	  generation,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  
way	  to	  identify	  other	  people	  across	  lives.9	  
Each	  period	  that	  a	  living	  person	  holds	  a	  useable	  asset	  they	  receive	  a	  specified	  payment.	  	  There	  
are	   two	   types	   of	   people	   in	   each	   economy.	   	   Half	   of	   the	   subjects	   are	   “Wealthy”	   and	   half	   are	  
“Poor.”	   	  Wealthy	  people	   receive	  a	  payment	  of	   $8	   for	  holding	  a	  useable	   asset	  when	   they	  are	  
Young	  and	  $5	  for	  holding	  a	  useable	  asset	  when	  they	  are	  Old.	  	  Poor	  people	  receive	  a	  payment	  of	  
$2	  for	  holding	  a	  useable	  asset	  when	  they	  are	  Young	  and	  $5	  for	  holding	  a	  useable	  asset	  when	  
they	   are	  Old.	   	   Thus	   both	  Wealthy	   and	   Poor	   people	   have	   the	   same	   value	   for	   a	   useable	   asset	  
when	  Old	  and	  income	  levels	  do	  not	  affect	  the	  gains	  from	  exchange	  when	  an	  asset	  is	  donated	  or	  
traded.	   	   The	  Young	  can	  be	   thought	  of	  as	  workers	   for	  whom	   income	  variation	   is	  due	   to	   labor	  
productivity	   or	   some	  other	   factor	   exogenous	   to	   the	   experimental	   environment,	  whereas	  Old	  
subjects	   can	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   being	   retired.	   	   Inactive	   people	   cannot	   hold	   any	   assets.	   	   Each	  
subject	  remains	  Poor	  or	  Wealthy	  throughout	  the	  entire	  experimental	  session;	  thus	  generations	  
may	  differ	  in	  the	  number	  of	  Wealthy	  and	  Poor	  people.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
There	  are	   two	   types	  of	  useable	  assets:	   	   yellow	  and	  green.	   	   Yellow	  assets	   last	   for	  one	  period.	  
Green	  assets	  last	  for	  two	  periods	  before	  turning	  yellow	  and	  lasting	  one	  additional	  period.	  	  After	  
one	  period	  yellow	  assets	  become	  red	  assets,	  which	  have	  a	  value	  of	  $0	  to	  both	  agent	  types.	  	  In	  
each	  new	  generation,	  two	  people	  are	  born	  with	  new	  green	  assets	  and	  one	  person	  is	  born	  with	  a	  
yellow	  asset.	  	  Every	  active	  person	  can	  observe	  the	  color	  of	  his	  or	  her	  own	  current	  asset.	  	  	  
In	  periods	   in	  which	   there	  was	  no	  market,	  Old	  people	  who	  owned	  a	  green	  asset	   (i.e.	  an	  asset	  
that	  was	  turning	  yellow	  and	  would	   last	  one	  more	  period)	  could	  choose	  to	  either	  “Donate	  My	  
Asset”	  or	  “Keep	  my	  Asset”	  with	  the	  default	  choice	  being	  to	  donate	  the	  asset.10	  	  A	  young	  person	  
with	  a	  yellow	  asset	  has	  a	  similar	  choice	  between	  “Accept	  an	  Asset”	  or	  “Keep	  my	  Asset.”	  	  Given	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  This	  approach	  is	  commonly	  used	  in	  macroeconomics	  experiments	  where	  the	  economy	  outlives	  individual	  agents.	  
See	  e.g.	  Lim	  et	  al.	  (1994),	  Marimon	  and	  Sunder	  (1994),	  and	  Marimon	  et	  al.	  (1993).	  
10	  Previous	  work	  by	  Samuelson	  and	  Zeckhauser	  (1988)	  has	  indentified	  a	  “status	  quo	  bias”	  in	  which	  people	  are	  likely	  
to	  maintain	  the	  default	  choice.	  	  This	  has	  been	  the	  impetus	  for	  organ	  donation	  policies	  in	  Europe	  where	  a	  person	  is	  
by	  default	  an	  organ	  donor	  unless	  they	  take	  active	  steps	  to	  not	  be	  an	  organ	  donor.	  	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  Abadie	  
and	  Gay	  (2006)	  provide	  evidence	  that	  this	  policy	  increases	  the	  supply	  of	  transplantable	  organs.	  As	  an	  experimental	  
design	  choice,	  this	  should	  strengthen	  any	  claim	  that	  the	  market	  “works”	  since	  it	  is	  competing	  against	  the	  best	  
“real-­‐world”	  alternative	  policy	  currently	  employed	  in	  any	  developed	  country.	  
the	  set	  up	  of	  the	  experiment,	  there	  were	  always	  two	  Old	  people	  with	  green	  assets	  and	  as	  long	  
as	   either	   of	   them	   donated	   the	   asset	   and	   the	   young	   person	   accepted	   the	   asset,	   then	   in	   the	  
following	  period	  the	  young	  person	  would	  hold	  the	  donated	  asset	  and	  earn	  $5.	  The	  asset	  would	  
become	  yellow	  in	  the	  next	  period	  when	  the	  recipient	  was	  Old	  and	  thus	  could	  not	  be	  donated	  
again	  to	  the	  following	  generation.	   	  The	  decision	  to	  donate	  the	  asset	  or	  not	  did	  not	  affect	  the	  
payoff	   to	   the	  Old	   person	   or	   the	   Young	   person	   in	   the	   period	   the	   decision	  was	  made.	   	   In	   this	  
sense	  the	  agreements	  are	  about	  what	  will	  happen	  to	  the	  Old	  person’s	  asset	  in	  the	  next	  period	  
when	  he	  or	   she	  has	  died.11	   In	   situations	  where	   there	  was	   a	   lottery,	   only	   those	  who	   selected	  
“Keep	  my	  Asset”	  had	  the	  chance	  to	  win	  the	  additional	  $100	  by	  guessing	  an	   integer	  from	  0	  to	  
999.	  	  After	  each	  period	  with	  a	  lottery,	  a	  winning	  number	  was	  drawn	  from	  a	  uniform	  distribution	  
over	  [0,	  999]	  and	  announced	  to	  everyone.	  	  	  If	  a	  person	  chose	  to	  donate	  or	  accept	  an	  asset,	  they	  
did	  not	  play	  the	  lottery	  even	  if	  they	  did	  not	  ultimately	  give	  or	  receive	  an	  asset	  as	  could	  occur	  
when	  a	  potential	  recipient	  was	  willing	  to	  accept	  but	  no	  one	  donated	  an	  asset	  or	  when	  a	  there	  
was	  no	  willing	  recipient	  for	  a	  donation.	  
When	  there	  was	  an	  active	  market	  for	  assets,	  Old	  people	  with	  green	  assets	  chose	  between	  “Sell	  
my	  Asset”	  and	  “Keep	  my	  Asset.”	  	  If	  the	  subject	  selected	  “Sell	  my	  Asset”	  they	  also	  had	  to	  enter	  
an	  ask	  between	  $0	  and	  $5	  in	  cents.	  	  Similarly,	  Young	  people	  with	  yellow	  assets	  chose	  between	  
“Buy	  an	  Asset”	  and	  “Keep	  my	  Asset”	  and	  those	  who	  opted	  to	  buy	  an	  asset	  had	  to	  enter	  a	  bid,	  
also	  between	  $0	  and	  $5	  in	  cents.	  	  If	  there	  was	  no	  bid	  or	  no	  ask	  then	  there	  was	  no	  trade.	  	  If	  the	  
lowest	  ask	  was	  above	  the	  bid	  then	  there	  was	  again	  no	  trade.	  	  If	  the	  bid	  was	  above	  a	  single	  ask	  
the	  price	  was	  the	  average	  of	  the	  bid	  and	  ask	  and	  the	  young	  person	  bought	  the	  asset	  from	  the	  
seller	  offering	  the	   lowest	  ask.	   	   If	   the	  bid	  was	  above	  two	  asks	  then	  the	  price	  was	  equal	   to	  the	  
average	  of	  the	  two	  asks	  and	  the	  young	  person	  bought	  the	  asset	  from	  the	  seller	  with	  the	  lowest	  
ask.	  A	  person	  was	  ineligible	  for	  the	  lottery	  if	  they	  placed	  a	  bid	  or	  an	  ask,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  
they	  were	  actually	   involved	   in	   a	   trade.	   	   Each	  period	  with	   a	  market,	   all	   of	   the	   subjects	   in	   the	  
session	   observed	   a	   summary	   report	   of	   any	   bids,	   asks,	   or	   prices.	   	   This	   was	   done	   in	   part	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Hence	  our	  market	  treatment	  creates	  a	  futures	  market.	  See	  Cohen	  (1989)	  for	  an	  argument	  in	  favor	  of	  organ	  
futures	  markets.	  
provide	  information	  to	  market	  participants	  and	  to	  aid	  price	  convergence	  since	  the	  markets	  are	  
thin	  and	  the	  parties	  do	  not	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  renegotiate.12	  
After	  completing	   the	  directions,	   subjects	  answered	  a	   series	  of	   comprehension	  questions,	  and	  
an	  experimenter	  went	  over	  the	  answers	  and	  privately	  corrected	  any	  mistakes.	  	  Once	  all	  of	  the	  
subjects	   had	   answered	   the	   questions	   correctly,	   the	   experiment	   began.	   	   After	   20	   periods	  
(19complete	  generations)	  of	   the	  baseline	  condition	  had	  been	  completed,	  subjects	  were	  given	  
additional	   instructions	  for	  the	  treatment	  that	  would	  be	   in	  place	  for	  the	   last	  20	  periods	  of	  the	  
experiment	  starting	  when	  the	  20th	  generation	  became	  Old.	  	  Subjects	  were	  not	  informed	  of	  the	  
number	  of	  periods	  in	  either	  portion	  of	  the	  experiment	  nor	  were	  subjects	  initially	  informed	  that	  
the	   experiment	   would	   have	   two	   parts.	   	   Copies	   of	   all	   directions	   and	   the	   comprehension	  
questions	  are	  available	  in	  the	  appendix.	  	  	  
After	   the	  experiments	  were	   completed,	   subjects	   answered	  a	  web-­‐based	   survey	  eliciting	   their	  
opinions	   on	   donating	   and	   trading	   organs	   and	   supplied	   limited	   demographic	   information.	   	   A	  
copy	  of	  the	  survey	  is	  included	  in	  the	  appendix.	  	  Once	  all	  subjects	  had	  completed	  the	  survey,	  one	  
of	   their	   experimental	   “lives”	  was	   randomly	   selected,	   and	   the	   subjects	  were	  paid	  based	  upon	  
those	  earnings.	  	  Each	  subject	  was	  paid	  in	  private	  and	  then	  dismissed	  from	  the	  experiment.	  	  The	  
average	   salient	   payment	   was	   $9.41	   and	   the	   experiment	   lasted	   approximately	   45minutes.	  	  
Subjects	  also	  received	  a	  $5	  payment	  for	  completing	  the	  survey	  and	  a	  $7	  participation	  payment.	  	  
A	  total	  of	  80	  undergraduates	  from	  a	  private	  university	  in	  the	  United	  States	  participated	  in	  the	  
experiment.	   	   Some	   subjects	   had	   previouslyparticipated	   in	   other	   economics	   experiments,	   but	  
none	  had	  participated	  in	  any	  related	  studies.	  
Hypotheses	  
Our	   first	   hypothesis	   concerns	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   Market	   and	   NoLotto	   treatments	   on	   the	  
provision	  of	  organs	  to	  sick	  individuals	  relative	  to	  the	  Baseline.	  Since	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  market	  
increases	  the	  marginal	  benefit	  of	  supplying	  an	  asset	  and	  the	  removal	  of	  the	   lottery	  decreases	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Specific	  institutional	  features	  can	  have	  a	  dramatic	  effect	  on	  market	  performance	  (see	  e.g.	  Friedman	  1993	  and	  
Coppinger	  et	  al.	  1980).	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  not	  to	  determine	  the	  optimal	  market	  structure	  for	  an	  organs	  
market,	  but	  to	  see	  how	  an	  active	  market	  could	  increase	  the	  supply	  of	  transplantable	  organs.	  	  The	  issue	  of	  designing	  
an	  organ	  market	  is	  a	  question	  left	  for	  future	  research.	  
the	   marginal	   cost,	   both	   treatments	   should	   increase	   the	   provision	   of	   organs	   relative	   to	   the	  
Baseline.	  	  
A	   naïve	   prediction	   based	   upon	  material	   self-­‐interest	   is	   that	   the	  Baseline	   treatment	  with	   the	  
lottery	  will	   lead	   to	   zero	   donations	   since	   subjects	  must	   give	   up	   a	   potential	   gain	   to	   provide	   a	  
benefit	   to	   others;	   however,	   results	   from	   dictator	   games	   suggest	   that	   people	   frequently	   part	  
with	  money	  when	  doing	  so	  yields	  direct	  benefits	  to	  others.	  Furthermore,	  as	  the	  ratio	  of	  other’s	  
gains	  to	  own	  losses	  grows,	  so	  does	  the	  amount	  given	  (Forsythe,	  et	  al.	  1994,	  Andreoni	  and	  Miller	  
2002,	  and	  Deck	  2009).	  Based	  upon	   that	  behavioral	  pattern	  one	  would	  expect	   somepeople	   to	  
accept	  an	  expected	  $0.10	  loss	  to	  provide	  a	  $5.00	  gain	  to	  the	  recipient.Anyone	  willing	  to	  forgo	  
$0.10	   should	   also	   be	   willing	   to	   donate	   the	   asset	   when	   it	   is	   costless	   to	   do	   so.	   	   Therefore,	  
donations	  should	  be	  at	   least	  as	  frequent	  in	  the	  NoLotto	  treatment	  as	   in	  the	  Baseline.	  When	  a	  
market	  is	  introduced,	  the	  supplier	  is	  compensated	  so	  that	  the	  loss	  cannot	  exceed	  $0.10.	  	  Under	  
the	  assumption	  that	  anyone	  willing	  to	  incur	  a	  $0.10	  loss	  would	  also	  be	  willing	  to	  incur	  a	  smaller	  
loss	  or	  even	  a	  gain	  to	  benefit	  another	  person,	  organ	  provision	  should	  be	  at	  least	  as	  frequent	  in	  
Market	  as	  in	  Baseline.	  	  	  
Our	   second	   hypothesis	   pertains	   to	   wealth	   effects.	   	  We	   create	   persistent	   income	   differences	  
across	  subjects	  in	  order	  to	  test	  for	  evidence	  of	  one	  of	  the	  common	  ethical	  concerns	  addressed	  
to	   those	   who	   favor	   the	   creation	   of	   markets	   for	   human	   organs.	   It	   is	   frequently	   argued	   that	  
market	  exchange	  in	  human	  organs	  will	  act	  as	  an	  “undue	  inducement”	  encouraging	  the	  poor	  and	  
desperate	  to	  disproportionately	  provide	  supply	  in	  such	  a	  market.	  	  This	  conjecture	  is	  formalized	  
in	  the	  following	  hypothesis:	  	  In	  the	  Market	  treatment,	  Poor	  subjects	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  offer	  
their	  organs	  for	  sale	  than	  Rich	  subjects.	  
We	   do	   not	   offer	   explicit	   predictions	   for	   the	   number	   of	   assets	   that	  will	   be	   exchanged	   in	   any	  
environment	   in	   part	   because	   a	   person’s	   behavior	   is	   contingent	   upon	   their	   beliefs	   about	   the	  
actions	  of	  others.	  	  An	  old	  person	  should	  not	  forgo	  $0.10	  to	  donate	  an	  asset	  if	  they	  believe	  the	  
other	   potential	   donor	  will	   donate	   or	   that	   the	   potential	   recipient	   has	   chosen	   not	   to	   accept	   a	  
donation.	   	   A	   young	   person	   should	   not	   forgo	   $0.10	   to	   accept	   donations	   if	   she	   believes	   that	  
neither	   potential	   donor	   is	   going	   to	   donate.	   	   In	   fact,	   in	   all	   three	   of	   our	   treatments	   everyone	  
selecting	  “Keep	  My	  Asset”	   is	  a	  Nash	  Equilibrium.	   	  We	  also	  note	  that	  there	   is	  no	  pure	  strategy	  
equilibrium	  price	  in	  the	  Market	  treatment	  because	  of	  the	  avoidable	  cost	  of	  having	  to	  forgo	  the	  
lottery	  to	  enter	  the	  market.	  	  This	  intuition	  for	  this	  is	  straightforward.	  	  Since	  a	  seller	  could	  earn	  
$0.10	  by	  staying	  out	  of	  the	  market,	  any	  seller	  must	  expect	  to	  earn	  at	  least	  $0.10	  from	  placing	  an	  
ask.	  	  This	  could	  not	  be	  true	  at	  any	  price	  below	  $0.10,	  but	  for	  any	  price	  above	  $0.10	  both	  sellers	  
would	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  undercut	  their	  rival.13	  
Results:	  Effectiveness	  of	  theTreatments	  
Our	   data	   consist	   of	   640	   salient	   organ	   supply	   choices	   and	   320	   salient	   organ	   demand	   choices	  
from	   subjects	   in	   8	   independent	   sessions.	   	   Half	   of	   the	   observations	   are	   from	   the	   Baseline	  
condition,	   while	   one	   fourth	   of	   the	   observations	   are	   from	   each	   of	   the	  Market	   and	   NoLotto	  
treatments.	   	   	   	  We	   present	   the	   experimental	   results	   as	   a	   series	   of	   findings.	   	   The	   first	   finding	  
considers	  the	  metric	  of	  lives	  saved.	  	  	  
Finding	  1:	  Only	  the	  NoLotto	  treatment	  reduces	  the	  number	  of	  subjects	  who	  die	  young	  relative	  to	  
the	  Baseline.	  In	  fact,	  the	  percentage	  of	  subjects	  who	  die	  young	  actually	  increases	  in	  the	  Market	  
treatment.	  
Figure	  1	  below	  displays	  the	  percentage	  of	  sick	  subjects	  who	  received	  organs	  by	  treatment.	  On	  
inspection	  it	  appears	  that	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  Baseline	  the,	  the	  NoLotto	  treatment	  reduces	  the	  
death	   rate,	   while	   the	  Market	   treatment	   marginally	   increases	   the	   death	   rate.	   This	   finding	   is	  
supported	  statistically	  by	  mixed-­‐effectslogistic	  regression	  where	  the	  eight	  sessions	  are	  modeled	  
as	   random	   effects	   (es)	   to	   compute	   treatment	   effects	   on	   the	   probability	   of	   death	   while	  
controlling	   for	   Period.14	   	   Specifically	   we	   estimate	   equation	   (1)	   where	   the	   binary	   dependent	  
variable	  is	  Deatht,	  which	  equals	  1	  if	  the	  sick	  person	  did	  not	  receive	  a	  new	  asset	  in	  period	  t	  and	  is	  
0	  otherwise.	  	  
Deatht	  =	  α0+	  α1NoLotto	  +	  α2Market	  +	  α3Period	  +	  ε	  +	  es	   	   	   	   (1)	  
NoLotto	   and	  Market	   represent	   dichotomous	   dummy	   variables	   indicating	   the	   absence	   of	   the	  
lottery	  and	   the	  presence	  of	   the	  market,	   respectively.	   	   The	   left	   column	  of	  Table	  1	   reports	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  See	  van	  Boening	  and	  Wilcox	  (1996)	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  markets	  with	  avoidable	  costs.	  
14	  All	  statistics	  and	  graphics	  created	  using	  R:	  A	  Language	  and	  Environment	  for	  Statistical	  Computing	  (2009).	  
Regressions	  computed	  using	  Harrell	  (2009)	  and	  Warnes	  (2009).	  
estimation	  results.	   	  Consistent	  with	  our	  hypothesis,	  the	  coefficient	  on	  NoLotto	   is	  negative	  and	  
significant	  indicating	  that	  removing	  the	  lottery	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  assets	  received	  by	  those	  
in	  need.	  	  However,	  while	  the	  coefficient	  on	  Market	  is	  negative,	  it	  is	  insignificant,	  indicating	  that	  
the	   specific	  market	   institution	   did	   not	   increase	   the	   number	   of	   assets	   that	   were	   successfully	  
transferred.	  	  	  
While	   the	  NoLotto	   treatment	  did	  not	   completely	   eliminate	   the	  organ	   shortage,	   the	   response	  
was	  encouraging.	  	  However,	  the	  negative	  effect	  of	  opening	  a	  market	  for	  organs	  is	  surprising	  and	  
warrants	  further	  attention.	  Specifically,	  to	  explain	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  treatments	  we	  
compare	  in	  greater	  detail	  the	  causes	  of	  death	  across	  treatments.Deaths	  may	  occur	  because	  no	  
one	   is	  willing	   to	   provide	   an	   organ,	   no	   one	   is	  willing	   to	   supply	   an	   organ,	   or	   the	   terms	   of	   the	  
exchange	  cannot	  be	  agreed	  upon.	  	  The	  third	  cause	  cannot	  occur	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  market	  as	  
donations	  effectively	  set	  the	  exchange	  terms	  at	  a	  price	  of	  0.	  
We	  define	  a	  demanded	  organ	  as	  an	   instance	   in	  which	  a	  sick	  subject	  chose	  “Accept”	  or	  “Buy”	  
and	  define	  a	  supplied	  organ	  as	  a	  choice	  to	  “Donate”	  or	  “Sell.”	  Thus	  there	  are	  excess	  demanded	  
organs	  when	  a	  sick	  subject	  chose	  “Accept”	  or	  “Buy”,	  but	  no	  subject	  chose	  “Donate”	  or	  “Sell.”	  
Similarly,	  there	  are	  excess	  supplied	  organs	  when	  someone	  chose	  to	  “Donate”	  or	  “Sell,”	  but	  the	  
potential	  recipient	  chose	  “Keep”.Table	  2	  provides	  summary	  statistics	  for	  the	  three	  treatments	  
indicating	  the	  number	  of	  periods	  in	  which	  subjects	  died	  young,	  demanded	  organs	  and	  supplied	  
organs	  as	  well	  as	  the	  number	  of	  periods	  with	  excess	  organ	  demand	  or	  excess	  organ	  supply.	  	  The	  
next	  series	  of	  findings	  consider	  how	  the	  treatments	  affected	  the	  number	  of	  organs	  demanded	  
and	  supplied.	  
Finding	  2:	  Deaths	  in	  the	  Baseline	  result	  from	  insufficient	  supply	  and	  demand.	  
In	   column	   1	   of	   Table	   2,	   note	   that	   of	   the	   160	   Baseline	   treatment	   periods,	   thesick	   subject	  
demanded	  an	  organ	  (i.e.	  choose	  “Accept”)	  in	  only	  115	  instances,	  or	  72%	  of	  the	  time.	  Hence,	  of	  
87Baseline	  deaths,	  45,	  or	  52%,	  were	  caused	  directly	  by	  a	  sick	  agent	  refusing	  to	  accept	  an	  organ.	  
We	   find	   this	   behavior	   somewhat	   surprising,	   but	   it	   could	   be	   rationalized	   depending	   on	   the	  
subject’s	  value	   for	   the	   lottery	  and	  expectations	   that	  an	  organ	  will	  be	  supplied.	  On	  the	  supply	  
side,	  at	  least	  one	  healthy,	  old	  agent	  chose	  to	  “Donate”	  an	  organ	  in	  95/160	  periods	  (56%	  of	  the	  
time).	   This	   result	   may	   be	   less	   surprising,	   given	   the	   aforementioned	   evidence	   from	   dictator	  
games,	  and	  one	  could	  conceive	  of	  utility	  functions	  that	  rationalize	  this	  behavior.	  However,	  for	  
our	   purposes	   it	   is	   enough	   to	   note	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   shortage	   under	   these	   conditions.Both	  
insufficient	   demand	   and	   insufficient	   supply	   contributed	   to	   premature	   deaths,	   and	   we	   ask	  
which,	  if	  either,	  of	  these	  failures	  the	  treatments	  successfully	  addressed.	  
Finding	  3:	  The	  NoLotto	  treatment	  increases	  demanded	  organs	  relative	  to	  the	  Baseline,	  but	  the	  
Market	  treatment	  does	  not.	  
Figure	   2(a)	   shows	   the	   percent	   of	   periods	   in	   which	   sick	   subjects	   demanded	   organs	   by	  
treatment.It	   is	  clear	  from	  this	  figure	  that	  the	  NoLotto	   treatment	   increases	  demand	  for	  organs	  
relative	   to	   the	   Baseline,	   but	   the	  Market	   treatment	   does	   not.	   This	   conclusion	   is	   supported	  
parametrically	  with	  a	  logistic	  regression.	  	  As	  before,	  the	  sessions	  are	  modeled	  asrandom	  effects	  
and	   our	   fixed	   effects	   compute	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   treatments,	   controlling	   for	   Period.	   	   The	  
dependent	  variable	   for	   the	  model	   is	  Demandt,	  which	  takes	  a	  value	  of	  1	   if	   the	  potential	  organ	  
recipient	   chose	   “Accept”	   or	   “Buy”	   in	   period	   t	   and	   is	   0	   otherwise.	   	   The	   model	   is	   given	   by	  
equation	  (2)	  and	  the	  results	  are	  reported	  in	  the	  center	  column	  of	  Table	  1.	  	  	  
Demandt	  =	  β0	  +	  β1NoLotto	  +	  β2Market	  +	  β3Period	  +	  ε	  +	  es	  	   	   	   (2)	  
As	  before,	  NoLotto	  and	  Market	  represent	  dichotomous	  dummy	  variables	  indicating	  the	  absence	  
of	  the	  lottery	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  market,	  respectively.	  	  Apositive	  and	  significant	  coefficient	  
on	  NoLotto	   indicates	   that	   removing	   the	   lottery	   increases	   the	   willingness	   of	   sick	   subjects	   to	  
accept	  organs.	  	  This	  change	  could	  be	  because	  sick	  agents	  value	  the	  lottery	  (with	  expected	  value	  
of	  $0.10)	  at	  more	  than	  $5.00,	  or	  it	  could	  be	  that	  the	  sick	  believe	  that	  others	  are	  more	  willing	  to	  
donate	   in	   the	  absence	  of	   a	   lottery.	   	  While	   the	   coefficient	  on	  Market	   is	   positive,	   the	  effect	   is	  
insignificant,	   suggesting	   that	   this	  market	   institution	   does	   not	   encourage	   those	   in	   need	   of	   an	  
organ	  to	  seek	  one.One	  explanation	  is	  that	  these	  subjects	  place	  a	  high	  value	  on	  the	  lottery,	  or	  
alternatively,	  that	  the	  sick	  person	  does	  not	  believethat	  prospective	  sellers	  are	  willing	  to	  trade	  at	  
an	  acceptable	  price.	  We	  return	  to	  these	  issues	  in	  detail	  below.	  
Finding	  4:	  Both	  the	  NoLotto	  and	  Market	  treatments	  increase	  the	  supply	  of	  organs	  relative	  to	  the	  
Baseline.	  In	  fact,	  the	  total	  quantity	  supplied	  is	  nominally	  (though	  not	  statistically)	  greater	  in	  the	  
Market	  treatment	  than	  in	  the	  NoLotto	  treatment.	  
Figure	  2(b)	  displays	  the	  percent	  of	  periods	   in	  which	  at	   least	  one	  organ	  was	  supplied.	   	  Clearly,	  
both	   treatments	   increase	   supply	   relative	   to	   the	   Baseline.	   Again,	   a	   mixed-­‐effectslogistic	  
regression	  with	  random	  effects	  for	  session	  is	  used	  to	  identify	  treatment	  effects	  controlling	  for	  
Period	   with	   dichotomous	   dummy	   variables	   for	   the	   treatments.	   	   The	   dependent	   variable	   in	  
equation	   (3)	   is	   Supplyt,	   which	   takes	   the	   value	   1	   if	   there	   was	   at	   least	   one	   supplied	   organ	   in	  
period	  t	  and	  is	  0	  otherwise.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Supplyt	  =	  γ0	  +	  γ1NoLotto	  +	  γ2Market	  +	  γ3Period	  +	  ε	  +	  es	   	   	   	   (3)	  
The	  estimation	  results	  are	  reported	  in	  the	  right-­‐hand	  column	  of	  Table	  1.	  	  Positive	  and	  significant	  
coefficients	   on	   both	   treatment	   variables	   indicate	   that	   the	   removal	   of	   the	   lottery	   and	   the	  
introduction	  of	  the	  market	  both	  increase	  the	  supply	  of	  healthy	  organs	  for	  transplant.	  Marginal	  
effects	  indicate	  that	  the	  NoLotto	  treatment	  increases	  the	  probability	  that	  an	  organ	  is	  supplied	  
in	  a	  period	  by	  34%	  relative	  to	  the	  Baseline;	  while,	  the	  Market	  increases	  the	  probability	  by	  38%.	  
Thus	  our	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  eliminating	  the	  costs	  of	  donation	  as	  in	  the	  NoLotto	  treatment	  
reduces	  deaths	  from	  organ	  shortage	  because	  it	   increases	  both	  demand	  and	  supply;	  while,	  the	  
Market	   treatment,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	   fails	   to	  reduce	  deaths	  because	   it	  has	  a	  positive	   impact	  
only	  on	  supply.	  	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  we	  see	  no	  evidence	  that	  creating	  a	  market	  crowds	  out	  
altruistic	  motives.	  	  	  
Although	   the	   NoLotto	   treatment	   saves	   lives	   in	   our	   experimental	   environment,	   we	   must	  
reiterate	   that	   our	   induced	   moral	   cost	   is	   no	   more	   than	   a	   highly	   stylized	   representation	   of	  
powerful	   factors	   that	   influence	   individuals’	   decisions	   to	   donate	   –	   culture,	   religion,	   values,	  
beliefs,	   etc.	   In	   our	   experiment	   it	   is	   trivial	   to	   eliminate	   this	   cost	   and	   observe	   the	   beneficial	  
effects,	   but	   in	   practice,	   this	   would	   require	   implementing	   a	   successful	   campaign	   to	  
fundamentally	  change	  the	  hearts	  and	  minds	  of	  millions	  of	  individuals.	  While	  altering	  the	  moral	  
dimension	  of	  transactions	   involving	  human	  organs	  might	  be	   ideal,	   it	   is	   likely	  unrealistic	   in	  the	  
short	   run,	  especially	  as	  a	  policy	  proposal.	  The	  purpose	  of	   this	   treatment	   is	   to	  show	  that	  such	  
costs	   matter,	   even	   in	   abstract	   form.	   From	   a	   practical	   perspective	   then,	   our	   focus	   is	   on	   the	  
Market	   treatment.	   Here	   the	   increased	   supply	   of	   organs	   is	   encouraging	   for	   proponents	   of	   a	  
market	   solution,	   but	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   institution	   to	   actually	   save	   lives	   in	   this	   environment	  
merits	  further	  examination.	  	  
Thus	  we	  return	  to	  Table	  2	  and	  analyze	  the	  causes	  of	  death	  in	  the	  Market	  treatment	  in	  greater	  
detail.	  The	  most	  salient	  fact	  is	  that	  deaths	  were	  largely	  not	  caused	  by	  lack	  of	  supply.	  There	  were	  
only	  9	   instances	   (11%	  of	  periods)	   in	  which	  no	  organ	  was	  offered	  for	  transplant	   in	  the	  Market	  
treatment,	  and	  in	  7	  of	  those	  cases	  sick	  agents	  expressed	  demand	  but	  were	  unable	  to	  purchase	  
a	  healthy	  organ	  on	  the	  market.15	  Of	  the	  53	  deaths	  in	  the	  Market	  treatment,	  25	  (47%)	  resulted	  
from	  insufficient	  demand.	  As	  shown	  in	  Table	  2,	  there	  was	  excess	  supply	  in	  23	  of	  these	  25	  cases,	  
so	  all	  but	  2	  of	  these	  deaths	  were	  feasibly	  avoidable	  if	  the	  sick	  agent	  had	  chosen	  to	  purchase	  an	  
organ	   and	   an	   agreeable	   price	   had	   been	   found.	   However,	   of	   the	   remaining	   28	   deaths,	   21	  
occurred	  with	  both	  a	  buyer	  and	  a	   seller	   in	   the	  market.	   	  These	  21	  subjects	  died	  because	   they	  
attempted	  to	  trade	  but	  did	  not	  submit	  mutually	  agreeable	  prices.	  	  
These	  unconsummated	  trades	  highlight	  the	  importance	  of	  institutional	  design.	  Recall	  that	  after	  
each	  period,	  all	   subjects	  observed	  any	  bids	  and	  asks	   in	   the	  market	  as	  well	  as	   the	   transaction	  
price	   if	  a	   trade	  occurred.	  Hence,	  some	  of	   the	  25	  cases	   in	  which	  sick	  agents	  chose	  to	  play	  the	  
lottery	   may	   have	   resulted	   from	   expectations	   derived	   from	   their	   own	   or	   others’	   prior	   failed	  
attempts	  to	  purchase	  in	  the	  market.	  An	  institution	  that	  was	  more	  successful	  at	  finding	  mutually	  
agreeable	  prices	  would	  likely	  have	  induced	  even	  more	  potential	  recipients	  to	  seek	  out	  an	  organ	  
and	   also	   encouraged	   more	   potential	   sellers	   to	   enter	   the	   market.	   Previous	   experimental	  
research	  has	  shown	  that	  markets	  with	  a	  repeated	  bargaining	  process	  or	  direct	  communication	  
leadto	  more	  mutually	   beneficial	   trades	   (see	   e.g	   Valley	   et	   al.	   2002	   and	   Ketcham	   et	   al	   1984).	  
Thus,	   if	   after	   the	   initial	  bid	  and	  asks	   failed	   to	  yield	  a	  mutually	  agreeable	  price,	  we	  permitted	  
subjects	   to	   submit	   updated	  offers,	   or	   if	  we	   allowed	   them	   to	   communicate	  with	  one	   another	  
directly,	  many	  of	  the	  Market	  treatment	  deaths	  might	  have	  been	  avoided.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  This	  compares	  favorably	  to	  the	  65	  cases	  (41%)	  of	  zero	  supply	  in	  the	  Baseline	  treatment,	  resulting	  in	  42	  deaths	  
from	  excess	  demand.	  
A	  related	  issue	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  supply	  and	  demand	  in	  our	  markets,	  which	  involve	  only	  a	  single	  
buyer	  and	  two	  sellers.	  The	  real-­‐world	  ratio	  of	  healthy	  to	  sick	  organs	  is	  much	  higher	  than	  2:1,	  so	  
the	  probability	  of	  finding	  a	  willing	  seller	  would	   likely	  be	  significantly	  higher	  than	  we	  induce	  in	  
this	  environment.	  Furthermore,	  the	  small	  number	  of	  subjects	  on	  either	  side	  of	  the	  market	  may	  
have	  contributed	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  our	   institution.	  Previous	  experimental	  work	  has	  also	  shown	  
that	  thicker	  markets	  tend	  to	  converge	  to	  competitive	  equilibria	  more	  quickly	  and	  more	  reliably	  
than	  those	  with	  only	  a	  few	  sellers	  (see	  e.g.	  Smith	  and	  Williams	  1990).	  Thus,	  in	  some	  sense	  our	  
environment	  was	  biased	  against	  the	  market’s	  success	   in	  saving	   lives,	  yet	  even	  so,	   it	  created	  a	  
substantial	  increase	  in	  supply.	  
Results:	  Distributional	  Consequences	  
We	   now	   turn	   to	   our	   second	   hypothesis	   above,	   pertaining	   to	   the	   distributional	   effects	   of	   a	  
market	   for	   organs.	   Recall,	   critics	   of	   market	   solutions	   to	   the	   organ	   shortage	   argue	   that	   the	  
decision	  to	  sell	  one’s	  organ	  will	  be	  undertaken	  primarily	  by	  the	  poor	  and	  desperate	  (e.g.	  Satz	  
2008,	   Archard	   2002,	   Borna	   1987).	   To	   test	   this	   hypothesis	   we	   induced	   persistent	   income	  
differences	  across	  subjects,	  and	  we	  ask	  whether	  poor	  subjects	  are	  disproportionately	   likely	  to	  
sell	  their	  organs.	  	  
Finding	  5:	  Poor	  subjects	  are	  more	  likely	  than	  rich	  subjects	  to	  offer	  their	  organs	  for	  sale.	  
Table	  3	  provides	   summary	   statistics	  on	   rate	  of	  organ	  provision	  and	  acceptance	  by	   treatment	  
and	  subject	  type.	  	  In	  the	  NoLotto	  treatment	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  percentage	  of	  people	  willing	  to	  
supply	  organs	  is	  similar	  for	  Wealthy	  and	  Poor	  subjects.	  	  However,	  in	  the	  Market	  treatment,	  the	  
increase	  in	  willingness	  to	  supply	  is	  much	  greater	  for	  the	  Poor	  (27%)	  than	  for	  the	  Wealthy	  (10%).	  	  
Finding	  5	   is	   supported	  by	  mixed-­‐effects	   logistic	   regression	  with	   random	  effects	  computed	   for	  
subjects	  (ei)	  where	  the	  dependent	  variable	  is	  Supplyi,t,	  which	  equals	  1	  if	  subject	  i	  was	  willing	  to	  
supply	  an	  organ	  in	  period	  t	  and	  is	  0	  otherwise.	  	  The	  model	  is	  shown	  in	  equation	  (4)	  where	  the	  
treatment	   dummies	   are	   as	   before	   and	   Poori	   is	   a	   dichotomous	   dummy	   variable	   indicating	  
whether	  subject	  i	  is	  poor.	  	  
Supplyi,t	   =	  δ0	   +	  δ1NoLotto	  +	  δ2Market	  +	  δ3Poori	   +	  δ4Period	  +δ5NoLotto×Poori	   +	  δ6Market×Poori	   +	  ε	   +	  ei
	   (4)	  
Table	   4	   contains	   estimated	   coefficients	   and	  marginal	   effects	   for	   the	   estimation.	   The	   positive	  
and	  significant	  coefficient	  on	  the	  interaction	  term	  Market×Poori	  indicates	  that	  poor	  subjects	  are	  
more	  likely	  than	  wealthy	  subjects	  to	  offer	  their	  organs	  in	  the	  market.	  The	  marginal	  effect	  is	  that	  
poor	   subjects	   are	   17%	   more	   likely	   to	   sell	   their	   organs	   than	   rich	   subjects.	   Insignificant	  
coefficients	  on	  Poori	  and	  NoLottoxPoori	   indicate	  that	   there	  are	  no	  distributional	  effects	   in	   the	  
other	  treatments.	  
Survey	  Results	  
The	  survey	  asked	  opinions	  of	  various	  organ-­‐related	  activities	  using	  several	  scales	  (see	  Appendix	  
C).	   	   The	   scales	   included	  morality,	  preferred	   legality,	  upsetting-­‐ness,	  offensiveness,	   rationality,	  
compassionateness,	  and	  sanity.	   	  The	  Cronbach	  alpha	  was	  high	  for	  each	  activity	  indicating	  that	  
these	   scales	  were	   capturing	   a	   consistent	  measure	   of	   the	   respondents’	   attitudes	   towards	   the	  
given	   behavior.	   	   Table	   5	   gives	   the	   average	   attitude	   towards	   each	   action.	   	   These	   scores	   are	  
bounded	  between	  1	  and	  5	  with	  a	  lower	  number	  indicating	  a	  more	  favorable	  outlook.	  	  The	  table	  
also	   shows	   how	   personal	   attributes	   and	   behavior	   correlate	  with	   the	   survey	   responses.	   	   Fifty	  
four	   percent	   of	   the	   respondents	   were	  male.	   	   Twenty	   one	   percent	   of	   the	   respondents	   were	  
Catholic,	  while	  28%	  reported	  being	  Protestant	  and	  19%	  reported	  being	  affiliated	  with	  another	  
organized	  religion.	  Forty	  four	  percent	  of	  the	  respondents	  rarely	  went	  to	  religious	  services,	  while	  
26%	  went	  at	  least	  once	  a	  month.	  	  	  	  
From	  Table	  5,	   it	   is	  clear	   that	   the	  respondents	  had	  positive	  attitudes	  towards	  donating	  organs	  
(Behaviors	   1	   and	   4),	   but	   opposed	   selling	   organs	   (Behaviors	   7-­‐10)	   or	   taking	   them	   without	  
permission	  (Behaviors	  2	  and	  5).	  	  However,	  the	  responses	  were	  more	  neutral	  towards	  the	  notion	  
of	   ‘compensating’	   organ	   providers	   (Behaviors	   3	   and	   6).	   	   This	   suggests	   a	   disconnect	   between	  
views	   on	   profit	   seeking	   in	   a	   market	   and	   the	   idea	   of	   compensating	   desirable	   behavior.	   	   Not	  
surprisingly,	  people	  who	  report	  being	  listed	  as	  an	  organ	  donor	  had	  more	  favorable	  opinions	  of	  
organ	  donation	  at	  death	  and	  while	  alive	   (ρ	  =	   -­‐0.22	  and	  ρ	  =	   -­‐0.24,	   respectively),	  but	  were	  not	  
significantly	  more	   likely	   to	  have	  a	   favorable	  outlook	  on	  people	   receiving	  money	   for	  providing	  
organs.	  	  Catholics	  have	  a	  less	  favorable	  opinion	  of	  donating	  organs	  at	  the	  time	  of	  death	  and	  for	  
compensation	  of	  such	  donations	  (ρ	  =	  0.23	  and	  ρ	  =	  0.25,	  respectively).	  	  Somewhat	  surprisingly,	  
those	  who	  report	  any	  religious	  affiliation	  are	  more	  opposed	  to	  live	  kidney	  donations	  (ρ	  =	  0.24),	  
but	   perhaps	   unsurprisingly	   are	  more	   supportive	   of	   the	   proceeds	   of	   a	   live	   donation	   going	   to	  
charity	   (ρ	   =	   -­‐0.21).	   	  We	   also	   note	   that	   we	   find	   no	   significant	   gender	   differences.	   	   Attitudes	  
towards	  organ	  donation	  and	  organ	  markets	  had	  no	   correlation	  with	  behavior	   in	   the	  Baseline	  
environment.	   	  However,	   for	   those	  who	  were	   in	   the	  market	   treatment,	   the	  willingness	   to	   sell	  
one’s	   organ	  was	   correlated	  with	   greater	   support	   for	   living	   people	   to	   donate	   organs	   and	   sell	  
organs	   if	   the	   proceeds	   go	   to	   charity	   (ρ	   =	   -­‐0.30	   and	   ρ	   =	   -­‐0.27,	   respectively).	   	   It	   was	   also	  
correlated	  with	  a	  greater	  tolerance	  for	  taking	  organs	  without	  explicit	  consent	  (ρ	  =	  -­‐0.30	  and	  ρ	  =	  
-­‐0.27,	  respectively)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Conclusions	  
We	   design	   a	   laboratory	   experiment	   with	   overlapping	   generations	   in	   which	   to	   analyze	   the	  
effects	   of	   various	   mechanisms	   on	   organ	   donation.	   We	   find	   that	   both	   the	   introduction	   of	   a	  
market	  and	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  opportunity	  costs	  of	  organ	  donation	   increase	  the	  supply	  of	  
usable	   organs	   relative	   to	   a	   baseline	   of	   presumed	   consent	   donation.	   While	   our	   NoLotto	  
treatment	   yielded	   a	   significant	   reduction	   in	   the	   death	   rate,	   we	   note	   that	   moral	   and	   ethical	  
concerns	  about	  transactions	  in	  human	  organs	  cannot	  easily	  be	  removed.	  This	  treatment	  rather	  
serves	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   moral	   and	   ethical	   concerns,	   modeled	   here	   as	   a	   relatively	   small	  
avoidable	   cost,	   can	   have	   a	   powerful	   impact	   organ	   supply	   and	   demand.	   Thus,	   based	   on	   the	  
evidence	  of	  increased	  supplyin	  our	  Market	  treatment,	  we	  argue	  that	  a	  suitably	  designed	  market	  
institution	  would	  likely	  provide	  a	  means	  of	  reducing	  unnecessary	  deaths	  from	  the	  current	  organ	  
shortage.	   Indeed,	   because	   of	   the	   institutional	   and	   structural	   features	   of	   our	   simple	   market	  
institution,	  the	  power	  of	  the	  market	  is	  understated	  by	  our	  design.	  	  
A	   market	   solution	   that	   incentivizes	   individuals	   to	   make	   taboo	   tradeoffs	   would	   provide	   an	  
obvious	  social	  benefit,	  in	  terms	  of	  human	  lives,	  but	  ethical	  concerns	  about	  violation	  of	  the	  body	  
remain	  and	  are	  augmented	  by	  additional	  concerns	  about	  coercion	  and	  equity.	  A	  social	  planner	  
could	   produce	   the	   same	   benefits	   as	   a	  market	   by	   forcibly	   taking	   organs	   from	   the	   healthy	   or	  
recently	  deceasedand	  giving	  them	  to	  the	  sick,	  but	  many	  proponents	  of	  the	  market	  would	  likely	  
argue	   that	   the	   difference	   between	   these	   two	   examples	   is	   in	   the	   voluntary	   nature	   of	  market	  
exchange.	  While	  this	  principle	  is	  clear	  enough,	  as	  Satz	  (2008)	  notes,	  the	  meaning	  of	  “voluntary”	  
is	  brought	   into	  question	   if	   the	  probability	  of	  donating	   is	  contingent	  on	  factors	  other	  than	  risk	  
preferences	  and	  the	  intensity	  of	  one’s	  ethical	  views	  on	  organ	  transactions.	  If,	  for	  example	  the	  
incentives	  affect	  individuals	  facing	  various	  economic	  circumstances	  differently,	  as	  is	  suggested	  
by	  the	  fact	  that	  poor	  subjects	   in	  our	  experiment	  are	  more	   likely	  to	  sell	   their	  organs,	  then	  the	  
existence	  of	  a	  market	  may	  constitute	  an	  “undue	  inducement”	  to	  poor	  individuals.16	  
Furthermore,	  a	  market	  with	  unequal	  distributional	  consequences	  could	  lead	  to	  perceptions	  that	  
rich	  individuals	  are	  essentially	  harvesting	  organs	  from	  the	  poor.	  In	  our	  environment,	  we	  note	  no	  
difference	   in	   the	   survival	   probability	   of	   rich	   and	   poor	   agents	   because	   no	   agent	   is	   unable	   to	  
afford	  an	  organ	  if	  he	  or	  she	  attempts	  to	  purchase	  one.	  In	  the	  real	  world,	  however,	  the	  market	  
price	  of	  organs	  could	  potentially	  price	  certain	  classes	  of	   individuals	  out	  of	  the	  market,	  further	  
exacerbating	  ethical	  concerns.	  	  
What	  we	  desire	  is	  a	  mechanism	  that	  increases	  the	  provision	  of	  organs	  by	  incentivizing	  donation	  
while	   also	   minimizing	   the	   ethical	   costs.	   Coffman	   (2009)	   shows	   that	   ethically	   questionable	  
actions	  are	  deemed	  less	  worthy	  of	  punishment	  when	  undertaken	  by	  a	  third-­‐party	  agent.	  Hence,	  
an	  alternative	  approach	   is	  a	  monopsonist	  who	  compensates	  voluntary	  donors	  at	  a	   fixed	  price	  
for	  donating	  an	  organ.	  Introducing	  a	  third	  party	  to	  the	  transaction	  (e.g.	  an	  insurance	  company	  
or	   government	   agency)	   and	  eliminating	   the	  direct	   sale	  of	   organs	   could	   allay	   ethical	   concerns	  
and	  promote	  donation	  by	  ensuring	  that	  risky	  donation	  is	  appropriately	  compensated.17Jasper	  et	  
al	   (2004),	   Haddow	   (2006),	   and	   Halpern,	   et	   al	   (2010)	   analyzed	   attitudes	   towards	   similar	  
proposals	  with	  surveys	  of	  medical	  professionals	  and	  the	  general	  public,	  with	  mixed	  results,	  but	  
little	  data	  exists	  on	  which	  to	  base	  a	  policy	  prescription.	  Future	  experiments	  can	  provide	  data	  on	  
the	   incentive	  properties	  of	   these	  mechanisms.	   Furthermore,	   since	  our	  environment	   concerns	  
deceased	   donations	   and	   futures	   markets	   we	   hope	   future	   work	   will	   utilize	   experiments	  
incorporating	  live	  donation	  and	  spot	  markets	  for	  organs.	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  and	  Supply	  





































	   	   	   Logistic	  regression,	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses,	  clustered	  by	  Session.	  
***	  	   p<	  0.001	  
	   	   	   **	   p<	  0.01	  
*	   p<	  0.05	  




Table	  2:	  Summary	  Data	  by	  Treatment	  
	   Treatment	  
	   Baseline	   NoLotto	   Market	  
Sessions	   8	   4	   4	  
Periods	   160	   80	   80	  
Died	  Young	  	   87	  (54%)	   20	  (25%)	   53	  (66%)	  
Periods	  Demanded	   115	  (72%)	   70	  (88%)	   55	  (69%)	  
Periods	  Supplied	   95	  (56%)	   69	  (86%)	   71	  (89%)	  
Periods	  with	  Excess	  Demand	   42	  (26%)	   10	  (13%)	   7	  (09%)	  
Periods	  with	  Excess	  Supply	   30	  (19%)	   9	  (11%)	   23(29%)	  










Table	  3:	  Donation	  and	  Acceptance	  Statistics	  	  
	   	   No	  Lotto	  Treatment	   	   	   Market	  Treatment	   	   	   	  
	   	   Lotto	   No	  Lotto	   Change	   	   No	  Market	   Market	   Change	   	   	  
Rich	  Accept	   31	   29	   	   	   23	   25	   	   Average	  Rich	  Bid	  
Rich	  Sick	   	   38	   32	   	   	   36	   42	   	   298.6	   	  
%Rich	  Accept	   81.6%	   90.6%	   0.090	   	   63.9%	   59.5%	   -­‐0.044	   	   	  
Poor	  Accept	   32	   41	   	   	   29	   30	   	   Average	  Poor	  Bid	  
Poor	  Sick	   	   42	   48	   	   	   44	   38	   	   236.3	   	  
%	  Poor	  Accept	   76.2%	   85.4%	   0.092	   	   65.9%	   78.9%	   0.130	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Rich	  Donate	   32	   62	   	   	   34	   37	   	   Average	  Rich	  Ask	  
Rich	  Old	  and	  Healthy	   80	   89	   	   	   84	   74	   	   259.4	   	  
%Rich	  Donate	   40.0%	   69.7%	   0.297	   	   40.5%	   50.0%	   0.095	   	   	  
Poor	  Donate	   30	   42	   	   	   28	   55	   	   Average	  Poor	  Ask	  
Poor	  Old	  and	  Healthy	   80	   71	   	   	   76	   86	   	   284.5	   	  
%Poor	  Donate	   37.5%	   59.2%	   0.217	   	   36.8%	   64.0%	   0.271	   	   	  
	  
	  
	  Table	  4:	  The	  Effects	  of	  Poverty	  on	  Donation	  




































	   	   	   	   Logistic	  regression,	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses.	  
***	  	   p<	  0.001	  
	   	   	   	   **	   p<	  0.01	  
*	   p<	  0.05	  
+	   p<	  0.1	  
	  
	  Table	  5:	  Analysis	  of	  Survey	  Responses	  
	   	   	   	   	  






















1. Donating	  a	  Kidney	  at	  the	  Time	  of	  Death	  
	   1.63	   0.79	   0.17	   -­‐0.10	   0.23	   0.08	   -­‐0.22	   -­‐0.04	   0.01	  
2. Taking	  a	  Kidney	  at	  the	  Time	  of	  Death	  without	  Explicit	  Permission	  
	   3.56	   0.91	   0.20	   -­‐0.08	   0.19	   0.08	   -­‐0.18	   0.00	   -­‐0.30	  
3. Paying	  the	  Family	  at	  the	  Time	  of	  Death	  in	  Return	  for	  a	  Kidney	  
	   2.70	   0.88	   -­‐0.17	   -­‐0.03	   0.25	   -­‐0.17	   -­‐0.01	   -­‐0.01	   0.00	  
4. Donating	  a	  Kidney	  while	  Alive	  
	   2.09	   0.88	   -­‐0.20	   0.24	   0.03	   -­‐0.16	   -­‐0.24	   0.00	   -­‐0.30	  
5. Taking	  a	  Kidney	  from	  a	  Living	  Person	  without	  Explicit	  Permission	  
	   4.44	   0.83	   0.15	   -­‐0.11	   -­‐0.01	   0.12	   -­‐0.15	   0.09	   -­‐0.27	  
6. Paying	  a	  Living	  Person	  in	  Return	  for	  a	  Kidney	  
	   3.06	   0.91	   -­‐0.18	   -­‐0.05	   0.00	   -­‐0.12	   0.11	   0.07	   -­‐0.21	  
7. Selling	  a	  Dead	  Person's	  Kidney	  on	  eBay	  
	   4.40	   0.9	   0.05	   -­‐0.20	   0.09	   -­‐0.01	   0.02	   0.06	   -­‐0.09	  
8. Selling	  a	  Dead	  Person's	  Kidney	  and	  Giving	  the	  Earnings	  to	  Charity	  
	   3.84	   0.92	   0.03	   -­‐0.18	   0.01	   0.03	   -­‐0.01	   0.09	   -­‐0.15	  
9. Selling	  a	  Living	  Person's	  Kidney	  on	  eBay	  
	   4.36	   0.9	   -­‐0.02	   -­‐0.12	   0.02	   -­‐0.02	   -­‐0.02	   0.11	   -­‐0.17	  
10. Selling	  a	  Living	  Person's	  Kidney	  on	  eBay	  and	  Giving	  the	  Money	  to	  Charity	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Appendix	  A:	  Experiment	  Instructions	  
This	   is	   an	   experiment	   on	   economic	   decision-­‐making.	   	   You	   will	   be	   paid	   in	   cash	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
experiment	   based	   upon	   your	   decisions	   and	   the	   decisions	   of	   others,	   so	   it	   is	   important	   that	   you	  
understand	  the	  directions	  completely.	   	  All	  payoffs	  are	  in	  cents,	  so	  100	  =	  $1.	   	   If	  you	  have	  a	  question	  at	  
any	   point,	   please	   raise	   your	   hand	   and	   someone	   will	   come	   to	   you.	   	   Otherwise,	   you	   should	   not	  
communicate	  with	  anyone	  else	  during	  the	  experiment.	  
This	  experiment	  is	  broken	  into	  a	  series	  of	  periods.	  	  In	  any	  period	  there	  are	  3	  young,	  3	  old	  and	  4	  inactive	  
people.	  	  In	  the	  next	  period	  the	  young	  become	  old,	  the	  old	  become	  inactive,	  and	  3	  of	  the	  inactive	  people	  
become	  young.	   	  Which	   inactive	  people	  become	  young	   is	  randomly	  determined,	  but	  everyone	  must	  be	  
inactive	  for	  at	  least	  one	  period	  after	  being	  old	  and	  before	  becoming	  young	  again.	  Notice	  that	  there	  are	  
more	  inactive	  people	  than	  young	  people	  so	  some	  people	  will	  be	  inactive	  for	  multiple	  periods.	  
Young	  and	  old	  people	  earn	  money	  by	  holding	  assets	  (shown	  on	  the	  screen	  as	  colored	  balls).	  	  There	  are	  
three	  kinds	  of	  assets.	  	  Red	  assets	  last	  for	  1	  period	  and	  are	  worth	  0	  to	  everyone.	  	  Yellow	  Assets	  last	  for	  1	  
period	  before	  becoming	  Red	  assets.	   	  Green	  assets	  last	  for	  2	  periods,	  before	  becoming	  Yellow	  assets	  in	  
the	  3rd	  period.	  	  Each	  period,	  two	  young	  people	  start	  with	  a	  Green	  asset	  and	  1	  young	  person	  starts	  with	  a	  
Yellow	  Asset.	  	  This	  is	  determined	  randomly.	  	  Notice	  that	  a	  Green	  asset	  lasts	  longer	  than	  its	  initial	  owner	  
can	  use	  it	  because	  people	  earn	  money	  while	  they	  are	  young	  or	  old,	  but	  not	  while	  they	  are	  inactive.	  	  	  	  
In	  the	  experiment	  there	  are	  wealthy	  and	  poor	  people.	  	  Your	  type	  is	  determined	  randomly	  and	  it	  will	  not	  
change	  during	  the	  entire	  experiment.	  	  	  	  
1)	   Wealthy	   people	   earn	   800	   from	   holding	   a	   Yellow	   or	   Green	   asset	   while	   young.	  	  
2)	  Poor	  people	  earn	  200	  from	  holding	  a	  Yellow	  or	  Green	  asset	  while	  young.	  	  	  
Green	  and	  Yellow	  assets	  are	  always	  worth	  500	   to	  an	  old	  person,	   regardless	  of	  whether	   the	  person	   is	  
Wealthy	  or	  Poor.	  	  Young	  people	  never	  have	  Red	  assets	  and	  no	  one	  can	  hold	  more	  than	  one	  asset.	  	  	  
Here	  are	  screen	  images	  for	  	  	  
a	  Young	  Poor	  Person	  with	  a	  Green	  Asset	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  &	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  an	  Old	  Wealthy	  Person	  with	  a	  Yellow	  Asset	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	  
	  
Period	  earnings	  are	  shown	  in	  the	  table	  at	  the	  bottom	  right	  of	  the	  screen	  (earnings	  are	  updated	  after	  the	  
period	  ends).	   	  Green	   rows	   indicate	  active	  periods.	   	   Since	  people	  cycle	   through	  being	  young,	   then	  old,	  
then	  inactive,	  active	  periods	  come	  in	  pairs.	  	  After	  the	  entire	  experiment	  is	  completed,	  one	  pair	  of	  active	  
periods	  will	  be	  randomly	  selected	  to	  determine	  your	  payoff.	  	  	  
You	   cannot	   earn	  money	  with	   an	   asset	  when	   you	   are	   inactive;	   nor	   can	   you	   keep	   it	   until	   you	   become	  
young	  again.	  	  If	  you	  are	  old	  and	  have	  a	  Green	  asset,	  you	  can	  “Keep	  My	  Asset”	  or	  you	  can	  “Donate	  My	  
Asset.”	  Donating	  the	  asset	  means	  that	  a	  young	  person	  with	  a	  yellow	  asset	  
this	  period	  can	  use	  your	  asset	  next	  period.	  	  Regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  
old	  person	  donates	  her	  asset,	  she	  earns	  500	  in	  the	  period	  in	  which	  she	  was	  
old.	  The	  donation	  occurs	   in	   the	  next	  period	  when	  the	  old	  person	  becomes	   inactive.	   	  The	  default	   is	   to	  
“Donate	  My	  Asset.”	  If	  you	  want,	  you	  can	  make	  the	  donation	  by	  pressing	  “Confirm	  Choice.”	  	  If	  you	  want	  
to	  “Keep	  My	  Asset”	  you	  must	  first	  click	  on	  this	  option	  and	  then	  click	  “Confirm	  Choice”.	  	  	  	  
If	   (and	   only	   if)	   an	   old	   person	   chooses	   “Keep	  My	   Asset”	   she	   has	   the	   opportunity	   to	   guess	   a	   random	  
number	  between	  0	  and	  999,	  inclusive,	  to	  earn	  10,000	  (that	  is	  US$100).	  	  You	  enter	  a	  guess	  by	  typing	  it	  in	  
the	  box	  below	  “Keep	  My	  Asset.”	  After	  each	  period,	  everyone	  in	  the	  experiment	  will	  be	  informed	  of	  the	  
winning	  number.	  	  	  
A	  young	  person	  with	  a	  yellow	  asset	  has	  to	  choose	  between	  “Accept	  New	  Asset”	  (the	  default	  option)	  or	  
“Keep	  My	  Asset.”	  	  Accepting	  an	  asset	  means	  that	  if	  an	  old	  person	  donates	  
an	   asset	   then	   the	   young	   person	   could	   use	   it	   to	   earn	   money	   in	   the	   next	  
period	  after	  becoming	  old.	  	  A	  young	  person	  who	  instead	  opts	  to	  “Keep	  my	  
Asset”	  will	  be	  able	  to	  guess	  a	  number	  between	  0	  and	  999,	  inclusive,	  to	  win	  
10,000.	  	  Either	  choice	  must	  be	  confirmed	  by	  pressing	  the	  “Confirm	  Choice”	  button.	  	  
A	  young	  person	  with	  a	  green	  asset	  will	  not	  make	  a	  decision	  (as	  he	  automatically	  keeps	  his	  asset),	  nor	  will	  
an	  old	  person	  with	  a	  yellow	  or	  red	  asset	  (as	  this	  asset	  has	  no	  value	  in	  the	  next	  period).	  	  Inactive	  people	  
also	  have	  no	  decision	  to	  make.	  	  	  
In	  the	  following	  examples	  (poor)	  Person	  A	  is	  old	  in	  period	  6	  and	  (wealthy)	  Person	  B	  is	  young	  in	  period	  6.	  	  	  
Example	  1:	  	  	  In	  Period	  6,	  Person	  A	  chooses	  to	  
“Donate	  My	  Asset”	  and	  Person	  B	  chooses	  to	  
“Accept	  New	  Asset.”	  	  	  	  	  
Here	  Person	  A	  donates	  the	  asset	  to	  Person	  B.	  	  
No	  one	  has	  the	  chance	  to	  earn	  10,000.	  
Period	  	   	  A	  is	  Poor	   B	  is	  Wealthy	  
5	   Young	  	  	  200	   	  	  	  	  	  Inactive	  0	  
6	   Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	   	  	  	  	  	  Young	  	  	  	  800	  
7	   Inactive	  	  	  	  0	   	  	  	  	  	  Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	  
	  
Example	  2:	  	  	  In	  Period	  6,	  Person	  A	  chooses	  to	  
“Donate	  My	  Asset”	  and	  Person	  B	  chooses	  to	  
“Keep	  My	  Asset.”	  	  	  	  	  
Here	  Person	  B	  does	  not	  receive	  the	  asset	  and	  	  
only	  Person	  B	  has	  a	  chance	  to	  earn	  10,000.	  
Period	  	   	  A	  is	  Poor	   B	  is	  Wealthy	  
5	   Young	  	  	  200	   	  	  	  	  	  Inactive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	  
6	   Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	   	  	  	  	  	  Young	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  800	  +	  
	  	  	  	  chance	  at	  	  	  10,000	  
7	   Inactive	  	  	  	  	  0	   	  	  	  	  	  Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	  
Once	  you	  have	  completed	  the	  directions	  and	  all	  of	  your	  questions	  are	  answered,	  please	  press	  the	  “Enter	  
ID”	  button	  and	  enter	  your	  experiment	  ID.	  	  After	  you	  have	  done	  this,	  you	  will	  be	  given	  a	  brief	  quiz,	  which	  
will	  not	  affect	  your	  payoff	  in	  any	  way.	  The	  quiz	  is	  intended	  to	  make	  sure	  everyone	  understands	  how	  the	  
experiment	   works	   and	   how	   payoffs	   are	   determined.	   	   The	   experiment	   will	   begin	   after	   everyone	   has	  
completed	  the	  handout	  and	  had	  their	  responses	  checked	  by	  an	  experimenter.	  	  
No	  Lotto	  Treatment	  
The	  next	  set	  of	  periods	  is	  similar	  to	  those	  you	  have	  already	  completed.	  	  The	  only	  difference	  is	  that	  there	  
is	  no	  longer	  an	  opportunity	  to	  guess	  a	  number	  and	  earn	  10,000	  if	  you	  choose	  to	  “Keep	  My	  Asset.”	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	  
In	  the	  following	  examples	  (poor)	  Person	  A	  is	  old	  in	  period	  6	  and	  (wealthy)	  Person	  B	  is	  young	  in	  period	  6.	  	  	  
Example	  1:	  	  	  In	  Period	  6,	  Person	  A	  chooses	  	  
to	  “Donate	  My	  Asset”	  and	  Person	  B	  	  
chooses	  to	  “Accept	  New	  Asset.”	  	  	  	  	  
Here	  Person	  B	  receives	  the	  asset	  donated	  by	  
Person	  A.	  	  
Period	  	   	  A	  is	  Poor	   B	  is	  Wealthy	  
5	   Young	  	  	  200	   	  	  	  	  	  Inactive	  	  	  	  	  0	  
6	   Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	   	  	  	  	  	  Young	  	  	  	  800	  
7	   Inactive	  	  	  	  0	   	  	  	  	  	  Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	  
	  
Example	  2:	  	  	  In	  Period	  6,	  Person	  A	  chooses	  	  
to	  “Donate	  My	  Asset”	  and	  Person	  B	  	  
chooses	  to	  “Keep	  My	  Asset.”	  	  	  	  	  
Here	  Person	  B	  does	  not	  receive	  the	  asset.	  
Period	  	   	  A	  is	  Poor	   B	  is	  Wealthy	  
5	   Young	  	  	  200	   	  	  	  	  	  Inactive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	  
6	   Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	   	  	  	  	  	  Young	  	  	  	  	  	  	  800	  
7	   Inactive	  	  	  	  0	   	  	  	  	  	  Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	  
Once	  you	  have	   completed	   the	  directions	  and	  all	   of	   your	  questions	  are	  answered,	  please	  wait	  quietly.	  	  
The	  experiment	  will	  resume	  once	  everyone	  has	  completed	  these	  directions.	  	  Keep	  in	  mind	  that	  one	  pair	  
of	  active	  periods	  from	  the	  entire	  experiment	  will	  be	  randomly	  selected	  to	  determine	  your	  payoff.	  	  
Market/Lotto	  Treatment	  
The	   next	   set	   of	   periods	   is	   similar	   to	   those	   you	   have	   already	   completed.	   	   The	   only	   difference	   is	   that	  
instead	  of	  assets	  being	  donated,	  you	  may	  now	  buy	  and	  sell	  assets.	  	  An	  old	  person	  with	  a	  green	  asset	  can	  
now	  choose	  to	  “Keep	  My	  Asset”	  or	  “Sell	  My	  Asset.”	   	  Similarly,	  a	  young	  person	  with	  a	  yellow	  asset	  can	  
choose	  to	  “Keep	  My	  Asset”	  or	  “Buy	  An	  Asset.”	   	  Anyone	  who	  chooses	  “Keep	  My	  Asset”	  will	  still	  have	  a	  
chance	  to	  earn	  10,000	  by	  guessing	  a	  number	  from	  0	  to	  999,	  inclusive.	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	  
Old	  people	  with	  a	  green	  asset	  can	  make	  an	  offer	  to	  sell	  by	  typing	  it	  into	  the	  box	  below	  “Sell	  My	  Asset.”	  
Young	  people	  with	   a	   yellow	  asset	   can	  make	   an	  offer	   to	   buy	  by	   typing	   it	   into	   the	  box	  below	   “Buy	  An	  
Asset.”	   Offers	   to	   buy	   and	   sell	  must	   be	   integer	   amounts	   between	   0	   and	   500	   (the	   value	   to	   the	   young	  
person	   of	   the	   asset	   when	   he	   becomes	   old).	   	   You	   must	   press	   “Confirm	   Choice”	   after	   making	   your	  
decision.	  	  One	  of	  several	  things	  will	  happen	  in	  the	  market.	  	  
1.	  	  If	  no	  one	  selects	  “Sell	  My	  Asset”	  or	  no	  one	  selects	  “Buy	  An	  Asset”	  then	  there	  will	  be	  no	  trade	  and	  no	  
price	  in	  the	  market.	  	  	  
	  
2.	  	  If	  the	  offer	  to	  buy	  is	  below	  all	  offers	  to	  sell,	  then	  again	  there	  will	  be	  no	  trade	  and	  no	  market	  price.	  	  	  
	  3.	   	   If	  the	  offer	  to	  buy	  is	  greater	  than	  only	  one	  of	  the	  offers	  to	  sell	  then	  the	  price	  is	  the	  average	  of	  the	  
offer	   to	  buy	  and	   the	   lowest	  offer	   to	   sell.	   	   The	  young	  buyer	  pays	   the	  price	   to	   the	  old	  person	  with	   the	  
lowest	  offer	  to	  sell	  in	  exchange	  for	  use	  of	  the	  asset	  in	  the	  next	  period.	  	  	  
	  
4.	  If	  the	  offer	  to	  buy	  is	  greater	  than	  both	  offers	  to	  sell	  then	  the	  price	  is	  the	  average	  of	  the	  two	  offers	  to	  
sell.	  	  The	  young	  buyer	  pays	  this	  price	  to	  the	  old	  person	  who	  made	  the	  lowest	  offer	  in	  exchange	  for	  use	  of	  
the	  asset	  in	  the	  next	  period.	  	  	  	  
	  
After	  each	  period,	  everyone	  in	  the	  experiment	  will	  be	  informed	  of	  the	  market	  price,	  if	  it	  exists,	  as	  well	  as	  
all	  offers	  to	  buy	  or	  sell.	  However,	  no	  one	  will	  know	  who	  made	  which	  offer.	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  following	  are	  three	  examples	  of	  what	  could	  occur.	  In	  the	  examples	  (poor)	  Person	  A	  is	  old	  in	  period	  6,	  
(wealthy)	  Person	  B	  is	  young	  in	  period	  6,	  and	  (wealthy)	  Person	  C	  is	  old	  in	  period	  6.	  	  
Example	   1:	   	   	   In	   Period	   6,	   Person	  A	   chooses	   to	   “Sell	  My	  Asset”	  with	   an	   offer	   to	   sell	   of	   300,	   Person	  B	  
chooses	  to	  “Buy	  An	  Asset”	  with	  an	  offer	  to	  buy	  of	  400,	  and	  Person	  C	  chooses	  to	  “Keep	  My	  Asset.”	  	  	  	  	  
Here	  we	  have	  the	  offer	  to	  buy	  of	  400	  >	  the	  offer	  to	  sell	  of	  300	  so	  the	  price	  is	  350	  	  
(the	  average	  of	  400	  and	  300)	  and	  Person	  B	  buys	  the	  asset	  from	  Person	  A.	  	  Only	  	  
Person	  C	  has	  the	  chance	  to	  earn	  10,000	  since	  C	  chose	  “Keep	  My	  Asset.”	  	  
Period	  	   	  A	  (Seller)	  is	  Poor	   B	  (Buyer)	  is	  Wealthy	   C	  is	  Wealthy	  
5	   Young	  	  	  200	   	  	  	  	  	  Inactive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	   Young	  	  	  800	  
6	   Old	  +	  Price	  
500	  +	  350	  =	  850	  
	  	  	  	  	  Young	  -­‐	  Price	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  800	  -­‐	  350	  =	  450	  
Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	  
	  +	  chance	  at	  10,000	  
7	   Inactive	  	  	  	  0	   	  	  	  	  	  Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	   Inactive	  	  	  	  0	  
	  
Example	   2:	   	   	   In	   Period	   6,	   Person	  A	   chooses	   to	   “Sell	  My	  Asset”	  with	   an	   offer	   to	   sell	   of	   300,	   Person	  B	  
chooses	  to	  “Buy	  An	  Asset”	  with	  an	  offer	  to	  buy	  of	  200,	  and	  Person	  C	  chooses	  to	  “Keep	  My	  Asset.”	  	  	  	  	  
Here	  we	  have	  the	  offer	  to	  buy	  of	  200	  <	  the	  offer	  to	  sell	  of	  300	  so	  there	  is	  	  
no	  price	  and	  Person	  B	  does	  not	  buy	  the	  asset	  from	  Person	  A.	  	  Only	  	  
Person	  C	  has	  the	  chance	  to	  earn	  10,000	  because	  C	  chose	  “Keep	  My	  Asset.”	  	  	  	  
Period	  	   	  A	  is	  Poor	   B	  is	  Wealthy	   C	  is	  Wealthy	  
5	   Young	  	  	  200	   	  	  	  	  	  Inactive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	   Young	  	  	  800	  
6	   Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	   	  	  	  	  	  Young	  	  	  	  	  	  	  800	   Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	  
	  	  	  +	  chance	  at	  10,000	  
7	   Inactive	  	  	  	  0	   	  	  	  	  	  Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	   Inactive	  	  	  	  0	  
	  
Example	   3:	   	   	   In	   Period	   6,	   Person	  A	   chooses	   to	   “Sell	  My	  Asset”	  with	   an	   offer	   to	   sell	   of	   300,	   Person	  B	  
chooses	  to	  “Buy	  An	  Asset”	  with	  an	  offer	  to	  buy	  of	  400,	  and	  Person	  C	  chooses	  to	  “Sell	  My	  Asset”	  with	  an	  
offer	  to	  sell	  of	  $350.	  	  	  	  	  
In	  this	  case	  we	  have	  the	  offer	  to	  buy	  of	  400	  >	  both	  offers	  to	  sell	  of	  350	  and	  300.	  	  The	  	  
price	  is	  325	  (the	  average	  of	  300	  and	  350)	  and	  Person	  B	  buys	  the	  asset	  from	  Person	  A.	  	  No	  one	  
has	  the	  chance	  to	  earn	  10,000	  because	  no	  one	  chose	  “Keep	  My	  Asset.”	  	  
Period	  	   	  A	  (seller)	  is	  Poor	   B	  (buyer)	  is	  Wealthy	   C	  is	  Wealthy	  
5	   Young	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  200	   	  	  	  	  	  Inactive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	   Young	  	  	  800	  
6	   Old	  +	  Price	  
500	  +	  325	  =	  825	  
	  	  	  	  	  Young	  	  -­‐	  Price	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  800	  	  -­‐	  325	  =	  475	  
Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	  
7	   Inactive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	   	  	  	  	  	  Old	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	   Inactive	  	  	  	  0	  
	  
Once	  you	  have	   completed	   the	  directions	  and	  all	   of	   your	  questions	  are	  answered,	  please	  wait	  quietly.	  	  
The	  experiment	  will	  resume	  once	  everyone	  has	  completed	  these	  directions.	  	  Keep	  in	  mind	  that	  one	  pair	  
of	  active	  periods	  from	  the	  entire	  experiment	  will	  be	  randomly	  selected	  to	  determine	  your	  payoff.	  	  	  
Appendix	  B:	  Quiz	  Questions	  
1.	  A	  green	  asset	  lasts	  for	  how	  many	  periods?	  
a. 1	  Period	  
b. 2	  Periods,	  then	  it	  becomes	  a	  yellow	  asset	  for	  1	  more	  period	  
c. 3	  Periods	  
	  
2.	  How	  much	  does	  an	  active	  agent	  with	  a	  red	  asset	  earn	  in	  a	  period?	  
a.	  	   0	  
b.	  	   200	  
c.	  	   500	  
3.	  How	  many	  periods	  will	  an	  agent	  be	  inactive	  after	  being	  old?	  
a.	  	   1	  
b.	  	   2	  
c.	  	   Unknown,	  but	  at	  least	  1	  
4.	  Agents	  may	  hold	  more	  than	  one	  asset	  at	  a	  time.	  
a.	  	   True	  
b.	  	   False	  





6.	  If	  an	  old	  agent	  with	  a	  green	  asset	  chooses	  to	  “Donate	  My	  Asset”,	  then	  that	  agent	  will	  be	  able	  to	  guess	  




7.	  If	  a	  young	  agent	  with	  a	  yellow	  asset	  chooses	  to	  “Keep	  My	  Asset”,	  that	  agent	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  receive	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7.	  If	  a	  young	  agent	  with	  a	  yellow	  asset	  chooses	  to	  “Keep	  My	  Asset”,	  that	  agent	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  receive	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7.	  If	  an	  old	  agent	  with	  a	  green	  asset	  chooses	  to	  “Sell	  My	  Asset”,	  then	  that	  agent	  will	  be	  able	  to	  guess	  a	  
number	  between	  0	  and	  999	  in	  hopes	  of	  earning	  $100.	  
a. True	  
b. False	  
Appendix	  C:	  Survey	  Questions	  
	  
1)	  What	  is	  your	  gender?	  	   Male	   Female	  
2)	  How	  do	  you	  describe	  your	  religious	  affiliation?	  





	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
3)	  How	  often	  do	  you	  attend	  religious	  services?	  	  	  	  	  Never	  	  	  	  	  Rarely	  	  	  	  	  Monthly	  	  	  	  	  Weekly	  	  	  	  	  More	  than	  Once	  a	  Week	  
4)	  Is	  there	  anyone	  in	  your	  family	  or	  anyone	  of	  your	  close	  friends	  who	  received	  or	  donated	  an	  organ?	  Y/N	  
5)	  Are	  you	  currently	  listed	  as	  an	  organ	  donor?	  Y/N	  
6)	  Rate	  the	  following	  behaviors	  on	  the	  scales	  below:	  
Donating	  a	  Kidney	  at	  the	  Time	  of	  Death	  
Taking	  a	  Kidney	  at	  the	  Time	  of	  Death	  without	  Explicit	  Permission	  
Paying	  the	  Family	  at	  the	  Time	  of	  Death	  in	  Return	  for	  a	  Kidney	  
Donating	  a	  Kidney	  while	  Alive	  
Taking	  a	  Kidney	  from	  a	  Living	  Person	  without	  Explicit	  Permission	  
Paying	  a	  Living	  Person	  in	  Return	  for	  a	  Kidney	  
Selling	  a	  Dead	  Person's	  Kidney	  on	  eBay	  	  
Selling	  a	  Dead	  Person's	  Kidney	  and	  Giving	  the	  Earnings	  to	  Charity	  
Selling	  a	  Living	  Person's	  Kidney	  on	  eBay	  
Selling	  a	  Living	  Person's	  Kidney	  on	  eBay	  and	  Giving	  the	  Money	  to	  Charity	  
	  
Scales:	  
Highly	  Moral	   Somewhat	  Moral	   Unsure	   Somewhat	  Immoral	   Highly	  Immoral	  
Should	  Be	  
Banned	  
Banned	  with	  Minor	  
Exceptions	  
Permitted	  with	  Major	  
Restrictions	  





Upsetting	   Very	  Upsetting	   Moderately	  Upsetting	   Not	  Very	  Upsetting	  
Not	  Upsetting	  at	  
All	  
Not	  at	  All	  
Offensive	   Not	  Very	  Offensive	   Moderately	  Offensive	   Very	  Offensive	  
Extremely	  
Offensive	  




Compassionate	   Neutral	   Somewhat	  Cruel	   Very	  Cruel	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